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Giving Deference to Inaction: How Geddes v. United 
Staffing Alliance Employee Medical Plan 
Compromised an Employee’s Right to  
Meaningful Review Under ERISA 
Erin Nave∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 
(“ERISA”) regulates private sector employee welfare benefits and 
gives individual citizens the power to enforce these plans through a 
private right-of-action in the federal courts.2 ERISA was designed to 
protect employees’ rights to the benefits promised them in exchange 
for their employment,3 and accordingly gives citizens direct access to 
the U.S. District Court.  
Congress did not specify the standard of review to be used by the 
district courts in reviewing these contested benefits determinations 
under ERISA.4 Instead, the Supreme Court determined that cases of 
 
 ∗ J.D. (2009), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A. (2006) Political 
Science, Indiana University.  
 1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). 
 2. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Judicial Review of Denial of Disability Benefits Under 
Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 12 A.L.R. FED 
2D 1, 1 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).  
 4. “Although it is a ‘comprehensive and reticulated statute,’ ERISA does not set out the 
appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility 
determinations.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108–09 (1989) (quoting 
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).  
 At least one scholar has suggested that judicial construction of ERISA to infer a deferential 
standard of review is contrary to the protective intent of the statute. Mark D. DeBofsky, The 
Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 727, 728 (2004); see also Kevin Walker Beatty, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard of 
Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as Established By Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 
735–36 (2000); see infra Part III for further discussion of this criticism. 
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benefits denial are to be reviewed under the de novo5 standard, unless 
the terms of the employee benefits plan6 give certain discretion to the 
plan administrator,7 which warrants higher deference from the 
courts.8 Thus, in those cases where the employee benefits plan gives 
the plan administrator discretion to make decisions concerning both 
eligibility and benefits awarded to the plan beneficiary,9 courts give 
deference to the plan administrator as fiduciary10 and apply the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.11 The arbitrary and 
capricious standard is the least demanding form of judicial review of 
any sort of administrative action.12 This distinction is critical because 
 
 5. The de novo standard of review allows courts to examine all of the evidence and 
contentions of the plaintiffs without deference to either party. Donald Bogan, ERISA: Re-
thinking Firestone in Light of Great-West—Implications for Standard of Review and the Right 
to a Jury Trial in Welfare Benefits Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 630–31 (2004). 
 6. Under ERISA, an “employee benefit plan” or “plan” refers to either an employee 
welfare benefit plan, an employee pension benefit plan, or a plan that encompasses both. 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2000). For purposes of this Note, an employee benefit plan refers to an 
employee welfare plan, defined as: 
any plan, fund, or program . . . maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, 
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care 
or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or 
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day 
care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
 7. ERISA defines “administrator” as “the person specifically so designated by the terms 
of the instrument under which the plan is operated;” or if left undesignated, the plan sponsor; or 
if the plan sponsor cannot be identified, another person that the Secretary of Labor chooses. 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A).  
 8. Wooster, supra note 2, at 1; Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; see discussion infra Part I.A.  
 9. ERISA defines “beneficiary” as “a person designated by a participant, or by the terms 
of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(8).  
 10. ERISA defines “fiduciary” (as is relevant to an employee welfare plan) as someone 
who “exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of 
such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets . . . [or] has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
 11. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. For further discussion of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, see infra Part I.A. 
 12. Williams v. Int’l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 2000). “[T]he Court must 
decide whether the plan administrator’s decision was ‘rational in light of the plan’s provisions.’ 
Stated differently, ‘when it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, 
for a particular outcome, that outcome is not arbitrary or capricious.’” Id. (quoting Daniel v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/12
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the standard of review employed frequently decides the outcome of 
benefits disputes.13 
However, the circuit courts have not been unanimous in their 
decisions to extend application of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard in circumstances when the plan administrator retains all 
discretion in the plan instrument but parcels out some of that 
decision-making function to a third party.14 In Geddes v. United 
Staffing Alliance Employee Medical Plan, parents of a minor child 
brought a lawsuit against their employer and third-party independent 
claims manager for wrongful denial of benefits under their health 
care plan.15 In this case, the employer, as plan administrator, parceled 
out nearly all of its duties to a third party not named as fiduciary in 
the plan.16 The Tenth Circuit panel reversed the decision of the trial 
court and determined that even though certain discretionary duties 
were delegated to a non-fiduciary third party, the courts should still 
apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.17 This holding 
was an explicit departure from the decision of the Eleventh Circuit to 
apply the de novo standard in cases where fiduciary duties are 
delegated to non-fiduciaries.18  
This Note proposes that the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review should be eliminated in favor of a de novo standard of review 
in all benefits denial cases. Alternatively, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review should be strictly limited to cases where the 
benefits provider can plead with particularity enough facts to 
overcome a presumption in favor of the employee.19 
 
Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988); Davis v. Ky. Fin. Cos. Ret. Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 
693 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 13. Bogan, supra note 5, at 630. 
 14. Current Circuit Splits, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 507 (2007). 
 15. 469 F.3d 919, 922–23 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 16. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919, 922 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
 17. Id. at 932. 
 18. Current Circuit Splits, supra note 14, at 518–19. The decision in Geddes departs from 
the persuasive authority of the Eleventh Circuit in Baker v. Big Star Div. of the Grand Union 
Co., 893 F.2d 288 (11th Cir. 1989), in which the panel held that delegating discretionary 
authority to a non-fiduciary causes the plan administrator to forfeit fiduciary status and triggers 
de novo review. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 927.  
 19. See discussion infra Part III.  
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Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the ERISA statute 
and explains the origins of the arbitrary and capricious standard. Part 
II discusses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Geddes. Part III analyzes 
the logic of the court in reaching its decision in Geddes, concluding 
that the Supreme Court incorrectly denied certiorari and should have 
heard and overturned the Tenth Circuit’s decision. Finally, Part IV 
proposes possible Congressional reform to standards of review in 
ERISA benefits denial cases.  
I. HISTORY 
A. ERISA and Determining a Standard of Review 
ERISA was enacted in 1974 due to significant public concern that 
private pension plan funds were being mismanaged and abused by 
employers.20 In particular, Congress acknowledged that the lack of a 
statutory requirement for vesting provisions in pension plans caused 
employees who had worked for many years for a single employer to 
lose expected retirement benefits because their benefit plans did not 
specify any particular time period or mechanism for those funds to 
become non-forfeitable.21 In response, Congress drafted ERISA, 
 
 20. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. Dept. of Labor Employee Benefits Security 
Administration Webpage, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Mar. 13, 
2009). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) states: 
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit 
plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; . . . that the continued well-being 
and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by 
these plans . . . it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and 
to provide for the general welfare . . . that . . . safeguards be provided with respect to 
the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans . . . that despite the 
enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are 
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such 
plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and 
stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be 
endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been 
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated 
benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their 
beneficiaries. . . that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character 
of such plans and their financial soundness. 
Id. 
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which established minimum standards of conduct for private pension 
plans22 and provided a private right-of-action for citizens to redress 
their grievances in the federal courts.23 Since 1974, ERISA has been 
further amended by Congress to cover a wide scope of private 
employee benefits, including retirement and health care plans for 
both employees and their families.24  
Although ERISA provides for a private right-of-action for 
individual citizens in the federal courts, it does not specify the 
standard of review courts should use to adjudicate these cases. As a 
result, the Supreme Court clarified the standard of review issue in 
1989, in Firestone v. Bruch.25  
In Firestone, the Court determined that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review26 should apply when the plan 
administrator is given discretionary authority to determine both the 
eligibility for benefit plans and the administration of those benefits.27 
The Court principally relied on the background principles of trust law 
to justify the creation of this scheme.28 Where fiduciary principles29 
are implicated, which is generally the case in benefits eligibility 
 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 1101–1461 (2000).  
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (2000) (granting the private right-of-action for individual 
citizens to file lawsuits alleging ERISA violations in the federal courts). 
 24. History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 20 (“Since its enactment in 1974, ERISA 
has been amended to meet the changing retirement and health care needs of employees and their 
families.”).  
 25. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). Professor John Langbein 
identified three categories of judicial review of ERISA benefits denial claims promulgated in 
Firestone: First, de novo became the default standard, “meaning that in the absence of contrary 
plan terms, a reviewing court should decide a contested benefit denial case afresh, giving no 
presumption of correctness to the plan administrator’s decision to deny the claim.” John H. 
Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The UNUM/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review 
of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1322 (2007). Second, a plan 
instrument could be drafted in a manner “requiring the reviewing court to defer to the plan 
administrator’s decision, effectively defeating the de novo standard.” Id. Finally, “in such cases 
of plan-dictated deferential review, the reviewing court might need to temper its deference in 
circumstances in which the decisionmaker acted under a conflict of interest.” Id.  
 26. The arbitrary and capricious standard is generally interpreted by the courts to prohibit 
finding for the plaintiffs unless there is dishonesty, a failure to exercise proper judgment, or an 
unreasonable judgment. Bogan, supra note 5, at 631. Even if the court believes the fiduciary’s 
decision was wrong, it does not preclude judgment in his favor absent an abuse of discretion. Id. 
 27. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. 
 28. Id. at 111. 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000).  
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determinations such as the ones in Geddes and Firestone, the law of 
trusts, rather than the law of contracts, applies.30  
The Court in Firestone found both the legislative history and the 
plain language of the statute persuasive evidence that trust law should 
be controlling in ERISA litigation.31 ERISA is filled with the 
terminology of trust law, and the Court in Firestone continually 
referred to these terms. For example, “fiduciary,” “trustee,” 
“beneficiary,” and “participant” are all terms used multiple times 
throughout the statute.32  
Basic trust principles indicate that when the terms of the 
instrument give discretion to the trustee to exercise the power of the 
trust, courts cannot question the trustee’s judgment absent a clear 
abuse of discretion.33 As the Court acknowledged in Firestone, this 
idea has been a fundamental part of American law for more than a 
century.34 The Court in Firestone upheld this basic trust principle, 
reiterating that courts are not to interfere with the trustee’s exercise of 
discretion if it has been vested in him by the trust instrument itself.35  
 
 30. 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 35 (2000) (“The common law of trusts offers a starting point for 
an analysis of ERISA unless it is inconsistent with the language of the statute, its structure, or 
its purposes.”).  
 Some scholars have criticized the importation of trust law into the ERISA scheme. 
Professor Langbein noted that ERISA’s version of trust law diverges from traditional notions of 
trust law in one important area: plan administrators are not by their nature disinterested whereas 
trustees traditionally have no personal stake in the trust assets. Langbein, supra note 25, at 
1326. Regardless of how the administration of the plan is established, plan administrators are 
aligned with the employer, who is either a source of their revenue or a source of their salary, 
and as such cannot expect to be entirely disinterested. Id.; see also Bogan, supra note 5, at 633 
(“[T]he Firestone Court failed to examine the nature of a plan participant’s remedy for ‘benefits 
due . . . under the terms of his plan’ provided in ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) to determine whether 
that remedy corresponded with the Court’s application of trust law.”). 
 31. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110–11. The Court holds that certain principles developed in 
the laws of trust are applicable to ERISA fiduciaries. Id. at 110 (citing H.R. REP. NO 93–533, at 
11 (1973)). The Court also draws this conclusion from the plain language of the statute 
regarding its provisions concerning fiduciary responsibilities, which mirror the language and 
concepts of trust law. Id. at 110–11. 
 32. Id. at 110. The Court cites the language of various ERISA provisions, including 29 
U.S.C. § 1002 and § 1104. Id. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).  
 34. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111. 
 35. Id. (citing Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724–25 (1875)); see generally 90A C.J.S. 
Trusts § 351. However, as Professor Langbein points out, importing trust law into a regulatory 
scheme is not an exact fit. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1336. As a rule, employees generally do 
not have the opportunity to bargain with their employer regarding the applicable standard of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Giving Deference to Inaction 329 
 
 
ERISA defines fiduciary as one who “exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting management of [a] plan 
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets.”36 Under ERISA, the plan 
administrator/fiduciary has the authority to construe disputed terms 
and, in certain instances, the reasonable interpretation of such terms 
will not be interfered with.37 These powers are tempered by the 
fiduciary’s traditional duties of care and loyalty,38 which require plan 
administrators to act prudently and solely in the interest of the plan 
beneficiaries within the stated purpose of the plan.39 
B. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Medical Plan 
1. Background 
In Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Medical Plan, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review 
should be extended to cases where fiduciary duties were delegated by 
the plan administrator to non-fiduciary third parties because 
delegation of duties is an appropriate exercise of fiduciary discretion 
under ERISA.40 Geddes involved a dispute over whether Andrew 
Geddes41 was entitled to reimbursement from his insurance provider 
 
review as part of their benefits package—it is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Id. at 1323–24. 
Thus, unlike a traditional trust, there is no bargained-for agreement to defer to the decision of 
the plan administrator. Id. at 1324. 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2000). 
 37. 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 35 (2005). 
 38. Regarding ERISA plan administrators, the duty of care has been described as “the 
duty of prudent administration.” Langbein, supra note 25, at 1326. The duty of loyalty has been 
characterized as “requir[ing] plan fiduciaries to act solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000)). 
 39. 70 C.J.S. Pensions §§ 39a, 44. To determine whether an interpretation is reasonable or 
if an abuse of discretion has occurred, courts often look at such factors as internal consistency 
of the plan under the interpretation, any relevant administrative rules and regulations, the facts 
of the individual benefits determination that led to the interpretation, and any allegations or 
inferences of bad faith. Id. 
 40. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919, 927 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
 41. Andrew Geddes was a minor whose parents, Michael and Kari, filed suit on his 
behalf. Id. at 922.  
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for certain medical care resulting from a spinal injury.42 All parties 
agreed that Andrew was covered as a dependent under Michael 
Geddes’ health plan (“Plan”) and that United Staffing Alliance 
(“United”) was named as fiduciary and plan administrator in the plan 
instrument.43 The terms of the health plan also stated that United 
Staffing Alliance would employ a third party, Everest Administrators, 
Inc. (“Everest”), to administer the Plan subject to final review by 
United.44  
Upon reviewing the claims filed for Andrew, Everest directed 
United to pay only $40,921 of $185,892 in medical bills.45 Following 
failed appeals to Everest,46 the Geddeses filed a lawsuit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah47 alleging, among other claims, 
improper denial of benefits and breach of fiduciary duty in violation 
of ERISA.48 Specifically, the Geddes disputed the determination that 
 
 42. Id. at 922–23. Andrew severely injured his neck and spinal cord after diving into 
shallow water during a church excursion to Lake Powell in 2002. Id. at 922. Immediately 
following the accident, he was unable to move his arms or legs and was airlifted to St. Mary’s 
Hospital in Grand Junction, Colorado. Id. After spending time in intensive care, Andrew 
underwent surgery to repair his spine and was transferred two weeks later to a children’s 
hospital in Salt Lake City, where he received extensive in-patient care for his C-4 asia class C 
spinal injury and urinary tract infection for the next sixty days. Id.  
 43. Id. The plan document stated in pertinent part: “The company is the named fiduciary 
and is the plan administrator of the Plan. The Company will engage an independent claims 
administrator to administer the Plan, however, the Company makes all final decisions about 
benefits made from the Plan.” Id. at 934 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (quoting Aple. Supp. App. 
250).  
 44. Id. at 922 (majority opinion). The contract between United and Everest was 
unambiguous regarding the nature of their relationship:  
The Contract Administrator [Everest] shall not be deemed a Plan “fiduciary” as 
defined in ERISA. [Everest’s] services shall not include any power to make decisions 
regarding Plan policy, interpretations, practices or procedures, but shall be confined to 
ministerial functions such as those described by the U.S. Department of Labor in its 
Regulations Section 2509.75-8, D-2 . . . . [Everest] shall have no final discretionary 
control over Plan management, including disposition of Plan assets and Plan 
administration. [Everest’s] services hereunder shall be subject to review, modification, 
or reversal by the Plan Sponsor and/or Plan Administrator.  
Id. at 935. (Holloway, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 922 (majority opinion). 
 46. Id. at 923. 
 47. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on all claims. Geddes v. United 
Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, No. 2:03-CV-00440, 2005 WL 1414268 (D. Utah Mar. 
23, 2005). The district court granted summary judgment on the denial of benefits claim in favor 
of the plaintiffs. Id. at *12. 
 48. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 923. The denial of benefits claim was filed under ERISA 
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the unpaid portions of Andrew’s treatment were charged by the 
hospital at a rate beyond what was “usual and customary” and in 
some cases deemed “rehabilitative.”49 
The most potent issue in Geddes was whether the defendants were 
entitled to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review or whether 
the claims should be reviewed under the de novo standard.50 The 
district court evaluated the summary judgment cross-motions under 
the de novo standard, allowing the court to scrutinize all necessary 
evidence without deference to the defendant.51 Ultimately, the district 
court determined that Andrew Geddes was entitled to payment of 
nearly all the disputed medical charges.52 On appeal, however, the 
 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) and breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA §§ 404(a) and 502(a)(3). 
Id. The Geddeses also filed a charge alleging violation of ERISA § 502(c)(1)(B) because the 
defendants allegedly failed to provide requested benefits plan documents. Id. 
 49. Id. at 922–23. The Plan imposed a $2,500 cap on treatments considered rehabilitation. 
Id. at 923. The Geddes also disputed Everest’s interpretation of the term “usual and customary.” 
Id. 
 50. Id. In emphasizing the importance of determining the standard of review issue, the 
court pointed out that “[t]his question colors all the rest.” Id. 
 51. Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268, at *7–8. In its opinion, the district court delineated 
exactly what evidence it would consider under the de novo standard: 
Under the de novo standard of review, the Court considers the relevant documents in 
the record to determine the proper interpretation of the disputed provision in [the 
Plan]. The Supreme Court has held that any ambiguities in an ERISA plan must be 
construed against the employer, as the drafter of the disputed document, in accordance 
with trust and contract principles of construction. Furthermore, when reviewing the 
denial of benefits de novo, “the burden is on the Defendants to prove that Plaintiffs’ 
interpretation of the [Plan] is unreasonable.” And lastly, while the court is limited to 
the administrative record when conducting a review under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, the court may, when reviewing a plan administrator’s decision under a de 
novo standard, “supplement the administrative record ‘when circumstances clearly 
establish that additional evidence is necessary to conduct an adequate de novo review 
of the benefit decision.  
Id. at *8.  
 52. Id. at *12. The district court held that United’s instructions to Everest regarding the 
interpretation of “usual and customary” pricing were unreasonable and that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to coverage of St. Mary’s Hospital invoices as billed. Id. at *9–*10 (“In the absence of 
some explanation, guidance, or definition of ‘usual and customary’ as applied to the Plan, 
United Staffing’s approach of paying out-of-network providers the same discounted rate it has 
contractually arranged to pay in-network providers is an unreasonable interpretation of the 
Plan’s plain language.”). Further, the court held that all but a small portion of Andrew Geddes’ 
care—approximately $17,000 of the $99,000 in charges—were rehabilitative and should have 
been paid by United. Id. at *11. The court stated, “Calling Andrew’s treatment rehabilitative 
care would be inconsistent with the conclusion of Andrew’s treating physician at Primary 
Children’s that his injuries required a two-month in-patient stay.” Id. at *10. 
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Tenth Circuit panel found that the district court erred in applying the 
de novo standard of review, affirming part of the court’s decision as 
consistent under an evaluation using the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, and remanding the other claims to the district court for 
evaluation under the more deferential standard.53  
2. Majority Opinion 
The Tenth Circuit panel focused its analysis on the power given to 
United by the plan instrument.54 The terms of the Geddes’ benefits 
plan contained the so-called “Firestone” language,55 which named 
United as fiduciary plan administrator and granted it power to 
determine eligibility and administer benefits.56 The majority of the 
panel disputed the district court’s determination that Firestone 
language in the benefits plan was negated by United’s failure to 
exercise any of the discretionary authority given to it.57  
 
 Because the de novo standard of review was used, the district court was able to utilize 
extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms “usual and customary” and determine whether Andrew 
Geddes’ care was “rehabilitative.” See id. at *9–10. To determine the appropriate meaning of 
usual and customary, the court followed the persuasive authority of the Eleventh Circuit in HCA 
Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Employers Health Insurance Co., 240 F.3d 982 (11th Cir. 
2001). Id. at *9. To determine whether United’s interpretation of rehabilitative was 
appropriately applied to Andrew Geddes’ hospital treatment, the court referred to an affidavit of 
Andrew’s treating physician taken after the denial of benefits occurred. Id. at *10. The court 
defended its decision to use this extrinsic evidence on the basis that the nature of Andrew’s 
condition and care was too complex for the court to effectively analyze without the benefit of 
an expert opinion. Id. at *10.  
 53. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919, 928 (10th Cir. 
2006). The Geddeses subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari on May 2, 2007, which 
was denied by the Supreme Court on June 27, 2008. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance 
Employee Med. Plan, 128 S. Ct. 2993 (2008). For further information about the denial of 
certiorari, see infra Part I.B.4.  
 54. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 924. 
 55. In Firestone, the Supreme Court held that the de novo standard of review was to apply 
to all challenges to ERISA benefits determinations, unless the terms of the benefits plan gave 
the plan administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility of benefits or construe the 
terms of the plan. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In those 
cases, the Court held the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is to be applied. Id. 
 56. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 924. The plan stated “[United Staffing Alliance] makes all final 
decisions about benefits paid from the Plan.” Id.; see Firestone, 489 U.S. 101 (promulgating the 
language that triggers the arbitrary and capricious standard of review). 
 57. Compare Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268, at *4–7 (explaining that United failed to 
exercise their discretionary authority, thus negating the language in the benefits plan entitling 
them to a deferential standard of review), with Geddes, 469 F.3d at 923–27 (explaining that 
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On appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision 
to apply the de novo standard of review.58 The court held that 
delegation of fiduciary duties to Everest was proper under ERISA 
pursuant to the term of the Geddes’ benefits plan.59 According to the 
panel, neither Everest’s actions nor any alleged failure to act on the 
part of United caused forfeiture of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.60 Because United “accepted” Everest’s actions in 
reviewing the Geddes’ claims61 and ultimately remained liable for 
Everest’s decisions, the court determined that United still deserved 
deference from the courts.62  
Delegation of authority to Everest was proper, as the court 
explained, because: 
Once a health plan administrator, the ERISA counterpart to 
trust law’s fiduciary-trustee, has been delegated discretionary 
 
United’s delegation of authority to Everest under the terms of the plan was proper and because 
United reserved the right to review the claim and retained liability, United did not forfeit the 
deferential standard of review). 
 58. See Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268, at *8, for a discussion of how the de novo standard of 
review allowed extrinsic evidence to be admitted which aided the Geddes’ claims. Based on the 
evidence presented at the summary judgment stage, the district court concluded:  
In sum, the evidence demonstrates without dispute that the final determinations 
regarding the Geddes’ claims were never reviewed by a fiduciary. In light of this 
finding, the court holds that United Staffing waived its right to deferential review on 
any of the claims. Notwithstanding, United Staffing’s retention of discretionary 
authority through language in the Plan, this case is covered by the Tenth Circuit’s 
exception to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review: de novo review is 
appropriate if an administrator disregards claims and appeals procedures or opts not to 
exercise its discretion. 
Id. at *7; see also Geddes, 469 F.3d at 924 (“Despite [the Firestone language], the district court 
found that by delegating claims administration to Everest, United Staffing failed to exercise its 
administrative discretion and thereby forfeited its right to deferential review.”).  
 59. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 927. 
 60. Id. at 926. The circuit court held that the district court decision was not a valid 
extension of Firestone, went against the plain language of the ERISA statute, and violated trust 
law principles. Id. at 924. “To qualify [fiduciary] decisions for deferential review, Firestone 
requires only that ERISA health plan administrators and fiduciaries reserve discretionary 
authority to themselves in the plan document.” Id. at 925. 
 61. See discussion infra Part II (regarding criticism of the majority’s determination that 
United exercised any discretion).  
 62. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 924–25. The court disregarded the logic of the district court, 
which found that United failed to exercise its administrative discretion and thereby lost its 
fiduciary status for purposes of availing itself of the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review. Id. 
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authority under the terms of the ERISA plan, nothing prevents 
that administrator from then delegating portions of its 
discretionary authority to non-fiduciary third parties, as any 
similarly-situated trustee may do. This is especially true when 
such delegation is explicitly authorized by the plan document. 
The plan administrator remains liable, however, for decisions 
rendered by its agents, just as a trustee remains ultimately 
responsible for the actions of his delegates. In the instant case, 
the Plan specifically empowered its fiduciary, United Staffing, 
to employ an independent third party to review benefit claims, 
even while reserving to United Staffing final authority over all 
benefit determinations. United Staffing’s decision to delegate 
limited authority to Everest Administrators according to the 
terms of the controlling Plan instrument accords with Firestone 
and with the background principles of trust law. It does not 
constitute a failure of fiduciary judgment sufficient to warrant 
de novo review.63 
Thus, the majority of the court relied on the common law of trusts 
to bolster its interpretation that ERISA § 1105(c)(1) allows 
delegation of fiduciary duties to non-fiduciary third parties without 
forfeiting the court’s deference.64 So long as the plan administrator 
has been conferred discretionary authority as fiduciary by the terms 
of the plan instrument, the court held that the administrator exercised 
its discretion and is entitled to deference under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review.65  
 
 63. Id. at 926. 
 64. Id. at 925–26. The court quoted the ERISA statue, “The instrument under which a 
plan is maintained may expressly provide for procedures . . . (B) for named fiduciaries to 
designate persons other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities . . . under 
the plan.” Id. at 925. 
 65. Id. at 926–27. The majority in Geddes stated in its opinion:  
Indeed we would go so far as to say the plain language of the ERISA statute and the 
venerable body of trust law say just the opposite. Decisions made by an independent, 
non-fiduciary third party at the behest of the fiduciary plan administrator are entitled to 
Firestone deference because the third parties act only as agents of the fiduciary. 
Id. at 927. Also, see generally In re Butler’s Trusts, 26 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1947), which 
establishes that the trustee is at liberty to delegate administrative tasks to “agents” or “other 
persons” as is necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust. But cf. Karen Wahle and Ronald 
Dean, Litigating Participant Claims for Benefits, Remarks at the American Bar Association 
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Ultimately, the court found that United was liable to the Geddes 
for bills that it had deemed beyond the “usual and customary” rate 
because United’s interpretation was unreasonable even under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.66 However, the court remanded the 
claims that disputed Andrew’s care as rehabilitative back to the 
district court for determination under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.67  
3. Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting member of the Tenth Circuit panel viewed 
United’s grant of authority to Everest and the review of the Geddes’ 
claims in a strikingly different manner. Judge Holloway, in dissent, 
adopted the district court’s opinion, finding that United failed to 
exercise any of its discretion in reviewing the Geddes’ claims, instead 
solely relying on Everest for review and administration.68 Because 
 
Continuing Legal Education Presentation: Washington, D.C. (May 10–12, 2007) (transcript on 
file with the author), which provides a negative analysis of the court’s application and analysis 
of delegation principles in trust law to the situation in Geddes.  
 66. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 930–31 (“Given its departure from industry custom and its 
deleterious effect on Plan beneficiaries, we find United’s interpretation of ‘usual and 
customary’ arbitrary and capricious.”).  
 67. Id. at 928. 
 68. Id. at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“In this case, the fiduciary party with discretion 
(United) did not act, and the party which acted (claims administrator Everest) had no 
discretion.”); see also Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, No. 2:03-CV-
00440, 2005 WL 1414268, at *2 n.4 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2005). The deposition testimony of 
Terry Ficklin, a partner owner of United, made clear that United did not exercise its 
discretionary authority to make final determinations regarding claims under its benefits plans: 
[F]icklin . . . testified that United Staffing’s role only was to meet annually with 
Everest to review exclusions and deductibles: 
Q: So if I understand what you are saying, [United Staffing] met with Everest and 
[United Staffing] determined the exclusions, correct? 
A: Correct, on an annual basis. 
Q: Right, and you determined things like deductibles? Is that correct? 
A: Deductibles, yes. 
Q: On an annual basis? 
A: Prices. 
Q: . . . So when you say United Staffing makes all final decisions about benefits paid 
from the plan, that’s what you are referring to is those annual determinations? 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
336 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:323 
 
 
Everest was the only party which acted and was not named a 
fiduciary in the plan instrument, Holloway concluded the court did 
not owe any deference to United in this case.69 Furthermore, 
Holloway wrote that by delegating all of its discretion to Everest, 
United’s actions were contrary to congressional intent that benefits 
plans are to be administered by a fiduciary.70 
Holloway’s dissent was predicated on the trust law principle that 
courts owe deference to a fiduciary’s analysis of the claim, not the 
mere right to exercise discretion.71 Thus, Holloway concluded, if a 
 
A: Yes, that’s my understanding of what that meant when they explained that part to 
me. . . . 
Q: Okay. So United Staffing never sits down and reviews a claim from a plan 
participant to determine whether the claim is going to be covered or not? 
A: We do not. Never have. 
Q: That’s Everest’s responsibility, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Id. Additionally, Ficklin’s deposition testimony evidenced that United did not personally 
review nor participate in the appeals nor had any knowledge (prior to the current litigation) of 
the care received by Andrew Geddes and how much of his claims were reimbursed: 
Q: So United Staffing never sits down and reviews a claim from a plan participant to 
determine whether that claim is going to be covered or not? 
A: We do not. Never have. 
Q: Would it be fair to say that you don’t know any of the specifics? And again, when I 
say you, I am talking about United Staffing, know any of the specifics of the care that 
he received subsequent to his accident? 
A: Not the specifics, to my knowledge. 
Id. at *7. 
 69. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“The question instead is simply 
whether any discretion was exercised to which the courts owe deference. I believe that on this 
record the answer to that question is clearly no.”). 
 70. Id. Judge Holloway stated in his dissent:  
The majority’s holding, which is in effect that any act authorized by a party vested 
with discretion must be reviewed with deference, is contrary to—rather than dictated 
by—the common law of trusts, is contrary to the manifest intent of Congress for 
ERISA plans to be administered by a fiduciary, and creates a circuit split by adopting 
its unprecedented holding.  
Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000), which states that the intent of ERISA is to protect 
employees from being wrongfully deprived of their benefits.  
 71. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 933 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (citing Gilbertson v. Allied Signal, 
Inc., 328 F.3d 625 (10th Cir. 2003)).  
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fiduciary does not exercise discretion, nothing exists to which the 
court can defer, and a de novo review of the entire record is 
warranted.72  
Both the majority and dissenting opinions agree that Everest 
reviewed the Geddes’ claims and made all decisions regarding its 
initial administration and adjudication of subsequent appeals after 
certain benefits were denied.73 However, where Judge Holloway 
found a total failure to exercise discretion by United, the majority 
found United’s acceptance of Everest’s decision—even though 
admittedly without any meaningful review—to be a sufficient 
exercise of discretionary authority.74 
 
[I]f a trustee fails to act or to exercise his or her discretion, de novo review is 
appropriate because the trustee has forfeited the privilege to apply his or her discretion; 
it is the trustee’s analysis, not his or her right to use discretion or a mere arbitrary 
denial, to which a court should defer.  
Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 633 (emphasis added) (quoted in Geddes, 469 F.3d at 933 (Holloway, 
J., dissenting)); see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. 1(b) (2003).  
Furthermore, a court will intervene where the exercise of a power is left to the 
judgment of a trustee who improperly fails to exercise that judgment. Thus, even 
where a trustee has discretion whether or not to make any payments to a particular 
beneficiary, the court will interpose if the trustee, arbitrarily or without knowledge of 
or inquiry into relevant circumstances, fails to exercise the discretion.  
Id. 
 72. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 934. Based on the deposition testimony of United, it was clear and undisputed to 
the district court as well as all members of the 10th Circuit panel that United made no 
affirmative actions regarding the Geddes’ claims. Id. at 934 n.3. 
 74. Id. at 935–36.  
The contract under which Everest acted was quite clear on the point: ‘The Contract 
Administrator [Everest] shall not be deemed a Plan “fiduciary” as defined in ERISA. 
[Everest’s] services shall not include any power to make decisions regarding Plan 
policy, interpretations, practices or procedures, but shall be confined to ministerial 
functions such as those described by the U.S. Department of Labor in its Regulations 
Section 2509.75-8, D-2. . . . [Everest] shall have no final discretionary control over 
Plan management, including disposition of Plan assets and Plan administration. 
[Everest’s] services hereunder shall be subject to review, modification, or reversal by 
the Plan Sponsor and/or Plan Administrator.’ 
Id. at 935 (citation omitted). Though both Everest and United in their pleadings maintain that 
Everest never exercised any discretionary authority, both the majority of the panel and the 
dissenting judge agree that Everest took all actions with regard to review of the initial claims 
and subsequent appeals and United took no affirmative action. Id. at 934. 
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Despite both Everest’s and United’s claims that Everest was not 
endowed with fiduciary status nor acted with discretion in relation to 
the Geddes’ claims, the majority also argued that Everest indirectly 
exercised discretion and did so appropriately as an agent of United.75 
Judge Holloway refuted this position by pointing to Everest’s 
deposition testimony, which he found showed a lack of exercise of 
anything more than clerical services.76 Everest merely read codes that 
 
 75. Id. at 927 (majority opinion). “For purposes of liability, decisions made by third 
parties are decisions made by the fiduciary. If a plan administrator has been allotted 
discretionary authority in the plan document, the decisions of both it and its agents are entitled 
to judicial deference.” Id.  
 76. Id. at 935–36 (Holloway, J., dissenting). Judge Holloway found the following 
deposition testimony of Everest to prove that no discretion was exercised:  
Q. Now, when a claim would come in under this plan, give me an idea of how it was 
decided whether the claim would be paid, how much would be paid, or whether it 
would be denied. 
A. The basis for doing that is, of course, the provisions of the master plan document 
and the way that the care is coded or represented by the care provider. 
There are universal codes, diagnosis codes, service codes that are used in the medical 
care field. And those codes are required to be on the bill. If they’re not, then we are not 
able to process the bill. . . . And those codes are a way that the care provider 
themselves represents what the care provided was, what classification, what category 
of care it was. And from those codes we can determine which category on the schedule 
of benefits is the one that applies. 
Again, it’s a matter of correctly inputting the care codes in the claims administrator 
system. And that gives the claims administrator the information they need to 
categorize the care. Once the care is categorized, then the schedule of benefits 
dictates how the benefit payment is made. . . . 
. . . . 
But I think it’s a pretty good summary of what happens to say that it’s a matter of 
taking the codes that the care provider has assigned to the care they provided. That 
helps us categorize the care. And then from then—from that point on, the master plan 
document dictates what benefit is payable by the plan. 
. . . . 
Q. So then who makes the determination after that of the category that that particular 
type of service falls into? 
A. Almost without exception, the provider of care has categorized the service that they 
have provided by coding it in a certain way. So—when you use the term judgment, to 
me, that means that there’s some sort of judgment decision to make. And for the most 
part, that’s not the case. It’s a matter of simply—of correctly reading what the care 
provider codes are and putting it in the correct—putting it in the category that the care 
provider has assigned it to. 
Id.  
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had previously been promulgated by United. Employees 
mechanically matched those codes with the categories under which 
the medical providers placed their services and applied the limitations 
on reimbursement as required by the benefits plan.77 Because there 
was no subjective review on the part of either United or Everest that 
would amount to an exercise of discretion, Holloway held that only 
de novo review was warranted.78  
4. Denial of Certiorari 
The Geddeses appealed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, a result recommended by the 
Solicitor General’s office.79 While the Solicitor General’s office 
acknowledged the problematic nature of the Tenth Circuit’s 
analysis—either the panel interpreted the law incorrectly or made a 
dubious application of the facts—it ultimately advised, for reasons 
beyond the merits of the case, that Supreme Court review was not 
warranted.80  
 
 77. Id. at 936. 
 78. Id. at 932. Judge Holloway concluded:  
[A]ny suggestion that the agent exercised discretion is not supported by the evidence 
concerning how the claims were handled and is directly contrary to the contractual 
provision governing the relationship between the fiduciary and the agent. Further, both 
the fiduciary and the agent specifically denied in their pleadings, under constraints of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. [sic] 11, that the agent exercised any discretion. And the record is clear 
that the fiduciary, United, did nothing at all. Consequently, the majority’s naked 
assertion that some combination of the fiduciary and its agent exercised discretion is 
simply that–a naked assertion completely lacking in support. 
Id. 
 79. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance 
Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2993 (2008). 
 80. Id. at 8. 
Although petitioners’ reading of the court of appeals’ opinion is likely correct, plenary 
review is not warranted. There is at least some ambiguity in the opinion, and if 
interpreted as petitioners propose it would create an intracircuit conflict that the Tenth 
Circuit should be given an opportunity to resolve. Moreover, de novo review may 
ultimately be warranted in any event due to the United Staffing’s apparent failure to 
provide a full and fair review of petitioners’ claim, as required by ERISA, its 
implementing regulations, and the Plan.  
Id.  
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II. ANALYSIS 
The majority’s holding in Geddes distorts the purpose of the 
ERISA statute and effectuates an unjust result for the petitioners.81 
Because the Geddes decision creates a circuit split, the Supreme 
Court should have accepted certiorari and reversed the Tenth 
Circuit’s ruling. 
ERISA is a statutory scheme designed to safeguard the rights of 
employees, not employers or plan administrators.82 While the 
principles of trust law invoked by the Supreme Court in Firestone are 
clear in their protection of discretionary power vested in a fiduciary 
by the plan instrument,83 the Tenth Circuit’s protection of United’s 
inaction is irreconcilable with Congress’ intent in drafting ERISA. 
The Firestone language contained in the Geddes’ plan is meaningless 
unless accompanied by action.84 United’s fiduciary designation 
deserves no protection when left unexercised (a well-settled principle 
in other circuits as well as the common law of trusts.)85 
 
 81. Professor Kevin Beatty alludes to the sort of standard of review problem embodied in 
Geddes in the conclusion of his 2000 commentary (although he does not directly address it).  
Perhaps the most serious threat to the existence of the Firestone standard . . . [is] 
whether the current [arbitrary and capricious] standard, which essentially allows plan 
administrators to police themselves simply by supplying the proper language, is 
inherently unfair to plan participants. A standard that allows plan administrators to 
control the level of deference to be afforded their decisions does not appear to comply 
with the intent of the statute.  
Kevin Walker Beatty, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit 
Denial Claims as Established By Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 750–51 (2000). 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)(b)(1) (2000) (“[I]t is desirable in the interests of employees and 
their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare . . . that . . . safeguards be provided 
with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans. . . .”).  
 83. “Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee ... its exercise is not subject to control 
by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).  
 84. The Solicitor General’s Office determined that the Tenth Circuit’s decision could be 
interpreted in one of two ways—as an incorrect analysis of the law or an incorrect application 
of the facts. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance 
Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2993 (2008). If 
interpreted incorrectly analyzing the law, then “[the panel] fails to account for the need for 
discretionary authority to be exercised in order for deferential review to be appropriate.” Id. at 
10. If interpreted as an incorrect application of the facts, then there is “little (if any) support in 
the record” that United exercised any discretion.” Id. at 18. 
 85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. 1(b) (2003); Geddes v. United Staffing 
Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919, 933–937 (10th Cir. 2006) (Holloway, J., 
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The threshold question in Geddes is whether a plan 
administrator’s choice to merely accept a third party’s decision 
regarding denial of benefits without any meaningful review is 
adequate fiduciary action as envisioned by Congress when enacting 
ERISA. Given the undisputed intent of ERISA to protect employees’ 
access to their benefits,86 the level of review provided by United in 
this case is sorely lacking.  
The deposition testimony of both Everest and United shows that 
Everest took all affirmative action with regard to the Geddes’ claims, 
and that United was not even aware of the specific situation prior to 
litigation.87 In addition, the actions taken by Everest were mechanical 
and clerical, strictly adhering to general rules previously promulgated 
by United.88 Everest admitted in its testimony that its actions required 
no exercise of judgment of any kind.89 Accordingly, Everest also 
admitted that, upon examination, the portions of Andrew’s medical 
treatment deemed rehabilitative were in fact “medically necessary,” 
but Everest was bound to its interpretation because of United’s 
instructions on how to apply hospital coding.90  
Exercise of discretion, by its definition, involves “individual 
judgment,” “free decision-making,” “wise conduct and 
management,” “cautious discernment,” and “prudence.”91 Neither the 
failure of United to set up a meaningful appeals process for claims, 
 
dissenting); see also Gilbertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 631 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding de novo review is appropriate when a trustee fails to exercise his discretion); Nichols 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that deferential review 
is only appropriate in cases of actual exercise of discretion); Baker v. Big Star Div. of the Grand 
Union Co., 893 F.2d 288, 290–92 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that no deferential standard of 
review applied because the decision-maker did not exercise any discretion). 
 86. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 a(b)(1) (2000); see discussion supra Part I.A.  
 87. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting); see deposition testimony of Terry 
Ficklin, supra note 68. 
 88. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 936; see deposition testimony of Terry Ficklin, supra note 76.  
 89. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 923 (majority opinion); id. at 936 (Holloway, J., dissenting).  
The hospital chose to use the numerical code for rehabilitative services rather than the 
code for services connected with hospitalization for most of the services provided. 
Rehabilitative services were limited under the plan to $2,500.00. Everest read the 
codes used by the hospital and mechanically applied the limitation stated in the plan. 
This is the “exercise of discretion” to which, the majority holds, deference is required. 
Id. at 936. 
 91. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004). 
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nor the strictly clerical nature of Everest’s exclusive authority over 
the Geddes’ claims demonstrated any of these characteristics.  
The facts exposed by the depositions of both Everest and United 
show that the Geddes’ claims underwent a review process that never 
involved looking outside of the application of a set of arbitrary 
codes.92 Never once did United exercise any duty of loyalty or care93 
that would arise in the context of a fiduciary exercising its discretion. 
For example, United never examined whether the hospital’s coding of 
the services rendered for the Geddeses could have been categorized 
differently to properly afford them reimbursement for their 
expenses.94 Thus, the dissenting judge was correct in holding that he 
“disagree[d] with the fundamental premise that discretion was 
exercised by Everest as agent for United . . . [and] s[aw] no basis for 
employment of the deferential standard of review.”95 
Reversal of the Tenth Circuit’s decision is further supported by 
policy discussed in the Geddes’ petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. The Geddes contend that giving judicial deference to 
United on the mere basis of its delegation of duties to Everest 
effectively renders the term fiduciary impotent.96 No fiduciary duties, 
such as loyalty and care, owed to the Geddeses arise as a 
consequence of a third party non-fiduciary’s actions.97 Thus, 
 
 92. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 936 (Holloway, J., dissenting). 
 93. Langbein, supra note 25.  
 94. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 936. 
 96. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 
2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3610, 16–17 (U.S. May 2, 2007) (No. 06-1458). 
 97. Id. The appellants discussed this policy issue in depth in their petition: 
Because a fiduciary’s decisions are governed by the duties he owes to the beneficiary’s 
of the plan, it is logical that a Court should be required to defer to his discretion . . . 
When one exercises discretion, he becomes a fiduciary and must take upon himself 
fiduciary duties as to the matters with the scope of his discretion. In return, the courts 
will only interfere with his decision-making if his decisions are arbitrary and 
capricious. The Tenth Circuit’s decision undermines ERISA, and it ignores these 
bedrock principles of trust law. Its reasoning renders the term “fiduciary” a hollow 
term, because it gives deference to the decisions of non-fiduciaries, who owe no duties 
to plan beneficiaries and thus have not earned that deference. 
Id. 
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deference is given where deference has not been “earned,” which is 
contrary to the most basic principles of trust law.98 
Allowing ERISA litigation to proceed in this manner potentially 
deprives Andrew Geddes and many other litigants of their rightful 
benefits. Thus, contemporary interpretations of ERISA are not 
providing protection for the Geddeses and other employees any better 
than the common law protected pensions prior to 1974.99 Simple 
insertion of Firestone language in the plan instrument protects plan 
administrators like United from liability in all but the most egregious 
of circumstances,100 costing beneficiaries such as Andrew Geddes 
and his parents tens of thousands of dollars in medical care101 
rightfully earned as a benefit of employment. The majority’s decision 
in Geddes provides no incentive for plan administrators to act solely 
in the best interests of the insured. 
Furthermore, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is the 
least demanding form of judicial review.102 Where United, the named 
fiduciary, has failed to take any action to protect the rights of the 
beneficiary, Andrew Geddes, it would be unjust to limit the Geddes’ 
ability to present evidence and theories of recovery based on such 
 
 98. Id. at 16–17. Judge Holloway’s dissenting opinion also supports this policy 
proposition made by the Geddeses. While he does not dispute the majority’s contention that 
United remains liable for the actions of Everest as its agent, regardless of whether Everest acted 
as a fiduciary, he notes that “surely [ERISA’s] purposes go beyond ensuring that someone can 
be held liable through court action.” Geddes, 469 F.3d at 934 (Holloway, J., dissenting). He 
further explains, 
Under the ERISA scheme, a plan administrator exercises the function of handling 
claims with fiduciary responsibilities to the plan’s beneficiaries. This seems to be close 
to the heart of the legislative plan: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter 
to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries, by . . . establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation 
for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans . . . . 
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000)). 
 99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001. 
 100. Langbein, supra note 25, at 1322. 
 101. Approximately $99,000 of Andrew’s hospital costs were categorized as rehabilitative 
when Everest interpreted the hospital’s codes according to United’s instructions. Geddes v. 
United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, No. 22:03-CV-00440, 2005 WL 1414268, at 
*11 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2005). Everest admitted in a letter to the Geddes’ lawyers that 
approximately $82,000 of those costs were medically necessary. Id. Thus, it seems that their 
status as non-compensable under the Geddes’ benefit plan is questionable, at the very least.  
 102. Williams v. Int’l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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deference.103 Geddes created a significant conflict among the circuits 
in interpretation of ERISA law which should have been resolved by 
the Supreme Court.104  
III. PROPOSAL 
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review, as it operates 
today in benefits denial cases, should be eradicated by Congress in 
favor of a uniform de novo standard of review.105 Alternatively, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review could be retained, 
provided that a rebuttable presumption is created in favor of plan 
beneficiaries. This presumption should require specific pleading by 
the plan administrator to show appropriate fiduciary action was taken. 
By holding plan administrators to the de novo standard of review, 
the protective intent of ERISA106 is furthered because benefits 
providers would have an incentive to be actively involved in the 
claims review process. As Judge Holloway noted in his Geddes 
dissent, surely ERISA is about more than just holding someone liable 
in a court of law.107 Geddes demonstrates that the current procedure 
for invoking the arbitrary and capricious standard of review allows 
plan administrators to outsource their work with little supervision and 
even less review.108 The results of such business processes are on full 
display in Geddes: a mechanical denial of benefits by an outsourced 
claims review;109 a high probability that disputed benefits are 
 
 103. See discussion supra Part II. 
 104. See discussion infra Part III. 
 105. “A de novo or a less deferential judicial standard of review for review of a benefit 
denial would afford further protection of participants’ ERISA rights by ‘second guessing’ the 
decisions of a plan administrator.” Kathryn Kennedy, Judicial Standards of Review in ERISA 
Benefits Claims Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1094 (2001). 
 106. See discussion of intent of ERISA legislation, supra note 21. 
 107. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919, 934 (10th Cir. 
2006) (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“I realize that United’s delegation of duties to Everest does 
not relieve it of liability because it is bound by the acts of its agent, as the majority opinion 
notes. But surely this statute’s purposes go beyond ensuring that someone can he held liable 
through court action.”). 
 108. See also Beatty, supra note 4 (explaining that the theoretical use of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard is understandable in light of ERISA’s historical and statutory context, but 
its practical implementation is problematic because of the leniency it provides employers and 
administrators). 
 109. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 935–36 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“Everest read the codes used 
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rightfully owed to the plaintiffs under their plan;110 plaintiffs who 
were forced to resort to the courts to get any sort of meaningful 
appeal;111 and protection of the plan administrator by allowing a 
highly deferential standard of review.112  
If the law regarding standards of review in these cases was more 
strict, United would have been more likely to make itself aware of the 
Geddes’ objections to their denial of benefits and would have 
conducted an inquiry into Andrew’s injuries, the type of treatment he 
received, and whether the coding of these procedures was appropriate 
given the nature of his care. Only United had the power to change the 
application of hospital coding.113 Everest’s hands were tied.  
As demonstrated by Geddes, the liberal application of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review is the equivalent of an 
escape clause for inaction. Even if a plan administrator does not 
fulfill its fiduciary duties pursuant to trust law, the Tenth Circuit will 
still rely on those same principles to protect the company by limiting 
the rights of the beneficiary to present evidence and recover from 
wrongful conduct.114  
Many reasons exist as to why United would delegate all of its 
duties to Everest. Most, if not all, reasons likely are driven by 
traditional business models of profits and efficiency. But it is hard to 
believe that if faced with the possibility of litigation under de novo 
review of the entire record of its behavior toward its beneficiaries, 
United still would have persisted in failing to provide either review of 
Everest’s decisions or a meaningful appeals process for those 
beneficiaries denied benefits, or both.  
The differences in litigating a case under the de novo standard and 
the arbitrary and capricious standard are clear. Using a de novo 
 
by the hospital and mechanically applied the limitation stated in the plan.”).  
 110. Id. at 923; Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, No. 2:03-CV-
00440, 2005 WL 1414268, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2005).  
 111. Geddes, 469 F.3d at 932 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (“[T]he record is clear that the 
fiduciary, United, did nothing at all.”). 
 112. Geddes, 469 F.3d 919 (holding that the district court erred in allowing de novo review 
because to qualify their decisions for deferential review, Firestone requires only that ERISA 
health plan administrators and fiduciaries reserve discretionary authority to themselves in the 
plan document).  
 113. Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268 at *2 n.4, *6 nn.41–42. 
 114. See Geddes, 469 F.3d 919.  
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standard of review, the Geddeses were allowed to introduce the entire 
administrative record, as well as extrinsic evidence where necessary, 
and the district court made an independent interpretation of the 
benefits plan as it applied to Andrew’s care.115 The outcome was that 
the Geddeses were entitled to reimbursement for nearly all disputed 
expenses.116  
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court’s inquiry is 
limited to whether United acted dishonestly, failed to exercise 
reasonable judgment, or acted unreasonably, regardless of whether 
the panel would have made the benefits determination differently.117 
No extrinsic evidence is allowed. On remand, the Geddes will not be 
allowed to present the evidence which formed the basis of the district 
court’s initial decision in their favor: an affidavit from Andrew’s 
doctor explaining the urgent nature of his care and a letter from 
Everest118 to the Geddes’ lawyers calling the care “medically 
necessary.”119 Without this evidence, given the deference allotted to 
Everest’s decisions, it is likely United’s instructions on interpreting 
“rehabilitative” care would withstand scrutiny and the Geddeses 
would not recover those expenses.  
The arbitrary and capricious standard shelters United and other 
plan administrators, allowing an escape clause to help them beat most 
litigation120 and empowering them to act with far less than the 
traditional fiduciary intent called for in ERISA and dictated by the 
court in Firestone.121 Until the arbitrary and capricious standard is 
either eliminated or significantly limited in its application, plan 
administrators will not be held fully accountable under ERISA in 
 
 115. Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268, at *8.  
 116. Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268. 
 117. Bogan, supra note 5.  
 118. Geddes, 2005 WL 1414268, at *10. 
 119. Id. at *11 (“The court finds significant that Everest acknowledges it ‘extensively’ 
reviewed Andrew’s medical records and admitted that his care at Primary Children’s was 
‘medically necessary.’”). 
 120. See Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d 919, 923 (10th 
Cir. 2006). 
 121. “The lenient application of the deferential abuse of discretion standard creates 
negative results for claimants. [T]he rule for deferential review . . . serves no apparent function 
other than to impede protection of employee benefit rights.” Alison Rozbruch, Resolving the 
Conflict Between Two Visions for a Standard of Review in ERISA Denial of Benefit Claims, 9 
J.L. & POL’Y 507, 552 (2001). 
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courts of law following the Tenth Circuit’s approach. Congress 
should take action and instruct the courts to end or limit the use of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review in these cases.  
CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit’s reversal in Geddes constitutes tacit approval 
of a plan administrator’s failure to enact policies which would fairly 
have provided benefits rightfully earned by the plan beneficiaries. So 
long as the courts are willing to shield this behavior behind the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, ERISA will never be the 
protective measure that Congress intended.  
Congress should take immediate action and eliminate the liberal 
use of the arbitrary and capricious standard by the courts in ERISA 
litigation. By eliminating the deferential standard of review in 
benefits denial cases, or by severely limiting its application to cases 
where the plan administrator pleads with particularity its exercise of 
discretion, an incentive exists for plan administrators to create 
processes which ensure a fair distribution of benefits to employees. 
Plaintiffs who must resort to the courts for adjudication need those 
courts to have the power of independent, de novo review to ensure 
the protective intent of ERISA is present in its execution, and not just 
the character of its drafting.  
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